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Oral Statement
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Good morning Chairman Shelby, Senator Sarbanes, and other distinguished members of the committee. I am honored to have this opportunity to speak to you about my understanding of the nature of terrorism and about how lessons can be derived from that understanding for the disruption of their operations. As will soon be obvious, I am not an expert on terrorist finances, rather I am someone who has thought about and taught about terrorist movements for many years.

The first point to be made in any discussion of terrorism is to be clear about what it is we are discussing. The term terrorism is being used so loosely that it has come to lose much meaning. The only universally accepted attribute of the term is that it is pejorative. I would like simply to posit what I take to be the seven crucial characteristics of the term "terrorism."

1. Political. To constitute terrorism the act must be politically inspired. If it is not, then it is simply criminal activity.

2. Violent. If the act does not involve violence or the threat of violence then it is not terrorism.

3. Communication. The point of terrorism is to communicate a message. It is not violence for the sake of it or even violence in the expectation of defeating the enemy, but rather violence to convey a political message.

4. Symbolic. The act and the victim usually have symbolic significance. The shock value of the act is enhanced by the power of the symbol of the target. The whole point is for the psychological impact to be greater than the actual physical act. Terrorist movements are generally out-manned and out-gunned by their opponents so they employ these tactics to gain more attention than an objective assessment of their capabilities would warrant.

5. Non-state actor. Terrorism as we understand it is conducted by clandestine groups, not states. This is not to argue that states cannot use terrorism as an instrument of their foreign and domestic policy; they can and they do. Nor is it to argue that states cannot take actions which are the moral equivalent of terrorism; they can and they do. It is simply to argue that if we want to have any analytic clarity in understanding the behavior of these groups we must understand them as clandestine sub-state actors rather than as states. Moreover, in our dealing with states we have the whole panoply of international law to assist us in interpreting and responding to their actions.

6. The victim and the audience are not the same. The point of terrorism is to use the victim as a means of altering the behavior of the larger audience, usually a government.

Victims are often chosen at random or as representative of a larger group; particular victims are usually interchangeable. The more random the victim, the more widespread the fear, and the more effective the action.

7. Deliberate targeting of non-combatants. This is what sets terrorism apart from other forms of political violence, even the most proximate form, guerrilla warfare. Terrorists have elevated to the level of deliberate strategy, practices which are generally perceived as being the unintended side-effects of warfare, killing non-combatants.

My argument, then, is that it is the means employed and not the ends pursued nor the political context in which they operate that determines whether or not a group is a terrorist group.

The next point to be made about terrorist groups is that there are very real differences between them and if we want to fashion an effective counter-terrorism strategy we must understand these differences. I believe that terrorist groups can broadly be defined as belonging to one of several types. I am defining them here in accordance with what I take to be their primary motivation.

1. Ethno-Nationalist movements. These types of movements are among the most powerful, the most popular, and the most persistent of terrorist movements. They occur all over the world in rich and poor states, from Ireland to India. They range in size from a handful of Corsican nationalists to thousands of armed Tamils. The primary political goal of these types of terrorist movements is to attain a national territory consistent with their concept of their national or ethnic identity.

These groups are utterly different in motivation, organization, and appeal from the type of terrorism represented by al-Qaida. That said, these groups often enjoy significant, albeit often passive, popular support. Looking ahead, I see one real cause for concern. Just as the communist ideology on occasion fused with nationalist movements in the course of the cold war, so too nationalist movements, in regions with a significant Islamist presence, are vulnerable to the exploitation of the conflict for the purposes of a broader ideology.

2. Social Revolutionary Movements. These groups reached their heyday in the advanced industrialized countries in the 1970s and '80s. Their overriding objective was the violent destruction of the existing capitalist political-industrial-military complex and its replacement with a better social system based on the emancipation of the proletariat and the introduction of a just and classless society. In adopting this goal, violence was exonerated on the grounds that it was both a necessary component of this destruction as well as a virtuous and wholesome way of achieving it.

These groups proved most dangerous when they forged alliances with other opponents of the government, as the Italian Red Brigades did in uniting, for a time, the student and worker protest movements.

The apocalyptic nature of their aspirations is something they share with the contemporary radical Islamic groups which also seek complete destruction of the social and political order they inhabit.

3. Maoist Movements. Maoist movements tend to germinate in rural areas of poor countries as they have done in Peru, Nepal and the Philippines. The ideology calls for the liberation of the impoverished rural masses through revolutionary violence and then the defeat of the social order in the urban areas before eventual victory in conventional conflict. Maoism provides a template for revolutionary action for any group that purports to base its legitimacy on communion with the masses.

Maoist groups share with social revolutionary groups and radical Islamic groups a fanatical sectarianism, a millenarian approach, and a belief in the liberating qualities of violence. Like the social revolutionary groups, and unlike the radical Islamic groups, the ideology is entirely secular.

For those interested in combating Maoist terrorist groups, the trajectory of their violence and the nature of their appeal should come as no surprise since it follows a coherent and elaborated revolutionary technique.

4. Radical Religious Movements. While the mixture of religious and political motives has been a growing trend over the past thirty years, if one takes a longer perspective the story looks quite different. Prior to the French revolution, religious and political motives were invariably intertwined in terrorist ideology. There have always been two characteristics of religiously motivated terrorist groups. First, they exercise less restraint. If the audience is God there is no need to be constrained by the desire to avoid alienating one's supporters. Second, they have always been more transnational. Religions often transcend political boundaries, so these groups tend to have broader bases of support and broader bases of operation. Consequently, it requires effective collaboration between governments to counter them.

Religion plays different roles in different terrorist groups. Sometimes it serves purely as a badge of ethnic identity, as in Northern Ireland. Sometimes it is a mask for political motives, as in a number of Palestinian groups. Sometimes it is the defining ideology and guide to action, as in religious sects.

Three political events were crucial to the radicalization of the Muslim groups we face today. These were the Iranian revolution, and the subsequent effort of Iran to export its revolution overseas. Then there was the war in Lebanon, and the US withdrawal. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the war in Afghanistan, which not only demonstrated that a superpower could be defeated by organized Mujahadeen, but also provided legions of armed and trained Islamic warriors, imbued with their own success, which swelled the ranks of radical movements throughout the Middle East and, as we now know, provided the base for al-Qaida. These political events, when fused with the philosophical justifications for political violence against both non-believers and compromising Muslims (read secular Muslim leaders) derived from particularist interpretations of both Sunni and Shiite texts, have proven to be an explosive mix.

The four types of terrorist movement differ in significant respects from one another. They differ in their primary political motivations and how they organize themselves to achieve them. I believe that one can sensibly generalize within the different types of movements but only in very limited respects across them. I was asked specifically to address the issue of alliances or networks among terrorist groups. I believe that it should come as no surprise to us to see collaboration among different movements

which share similar primary motivations. The IRA in Northern Ireland and the Basque ETA, for example, are known to have close links. It is probably those links that helped to forge connections between the IRA and the FARC in Columbia that were recently revealed. Similarly the social revolutionary groups had quite extensive connections with one another, believing themselves all to be factions in the broadly-based communist revolutionary march to overthrow capitalism. It would come as no surprise to me to learn of links between different Maoist groups either, though perhaps given the nature of the terrain in which they operate this might be difficult. The links between the radical Islamic groups are the most extensive and well known. Al-Qaida had been forged on the basis of the multinational mujahadeen who arrived in Afghanistan to fight the Soviets. We of course know of the merger of several Islamic movements in the famous and rather grandly called "World Islamic Front" in 1998 calling on Muslim groups all over the world to unite. The organization self consciously tries to serve both as a base for other groups as well as operating on its own.

It would, however, come as a surprise to me to learn of significant alliances across these types of organizations. When cross-type alliances have occurred, they have been exclusively between social revolutionary and nationalist movements. Islamic organizations could not countenance the social views of social revolutionary or nationalist groups. Members of nationalist groups see themselves as utterly different from what they would consider as being the depraved Islamic groups. Nationalist groups have not taken the opportunities available to them to kill large numbers of people, preferring, in the words of Brian Jenkins, "lots of people watching, not lots of people dead." They perceive themselves as traditional freedom fighters and hence occupying a different moral universe than the architects of September 11th.

Latin American groups have had a tradition of collaborating among themselves. They see themselves as fighting for similar causes against similar enemies. The Monteneros, for example, shared the \$60 million in ransom they got for the kidnapping of the Born brothers in 1974 with other Latin American insurgency groups. In the early nineties the discovery of a terrorist treasure trove under a car repair shop in Managua demonstrated that the tradition of collaboration continues.

In trying to anticipate alliances among terrorist groups I would suggest, therefore, that a knowledge of the ideology of the group would help anticipate the nature of the alliances they are likely to make.

While the differences in primary political motivation undermine the degree to which one can generalize across types of groups, many groups with very different ideologies do share secondary motivations. These are the more immediate or secondary motives shared across types of groups: By far the most common motive of the terrorist is revenge and the second most common is publicity. They also, of course, seek funding. In these organizational ways one finds terrorist groups operating much like other, more conventional, organizations concerned for their own survival.

In none of these cases do the membership seek personal enrichment. For this reason the tools we have developed for anticipating and countering criminal elements are of limited utility against them. The members believe in their cause and they are often willing to sacrifice everything they have in order to further that cause.

It is important to bear in mind, for example, that the reason ten IRA prisoners starved themselves to death in Northern Ireland in 1981 was not to free Ireland from British oppression, but rather to secure political prisoner status for themselves and their comrades. Their sense of themselves as different and indeed morally superior to ordinary criminals was such that they were willing to starve themselves to make the point.

State Sponsorship.

Just as it is important to draw distinctions between different types of terrorist groups, I believe that it is also important to draw distinctions between different types of relationship between terrorist groups and their state sponsors. These relationships range from relationships in which the state exercises considerable control over the movements it sponsors to relationships in which the state and the movement it supports simply share an enemy. The relationship between al-Qaida and the Taliban, when the terrorists appeared to be sponsoring the state as much as the other way round, represents one extreme. Other relationships vary along a spectrum of state control. Occasionally terrorists are simply the covert arm of the state, as in the murder of dissidents overseas or intelligence operatives carrying out actions at the behest of the state. While called terrorism, these cases, such as the bombing of Pam Am 103 over Lockerbie, actually represent the covert actions of a state. In a very few cases the state closely directs the terrorist movement (as in the relationship between Syria and the PLFP-GC) but a far more common relationship is one in which the state supports the action of the terrorist group with financial and logistical support, training facilities, and safe havens, but the state does not actually direct the action of the terrorist movement. Iranian support of Hamas and Hizballah would fit this category. At the other end of the spectrum is a case like the Lybian support of the IRA in the late 1980s. In this instance Lybia and the IRA simply shared an enemy, Britain. Lybian support was simply a means of punishing Britain for its participation in the bombing of Tripoli in 1986.

In every case the terrorist movement is rendered more effective and more lethal by the support provided by the sponsoring state, but in every instance the state is capitalizing on a preexisting movement rather than creating one. The terrorist movements do not rely on the state for their survival. Rather, state sponsorship is one of several means of generating financial support for the movement. Other forms of support include raising money from the diaspora as Islamic and nationalist groups the world over have done successfully. Another popular fundraising mechanism is the operation of a legitimate front business to generate money for the cause. The Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka have perfected this technique. In other cases, terrorists raise money through extortion from the members of the society they claim to represent, as Maoist groups often do. In still other cases, they raise funds through criminal activity. Bank robberies and kidnapping were traditional favorites; today credit card fraud and in some cases drug dealing, have become popular. Raising money through criminal activity, however, is a high risk strategy for terrorist groups, exposing the membership to corruption and to capture, fudging the distinction they seek to draw between themselves and criminals, and undermining the basis of their popular support.

The crucial point to bear in mind about terrorism, of course, is that it is cheap. This is part of its appeal. The attack on September 11th is probably the most expensive

terrorist operation in history and it is estimated to have cost half a million dollars. It takes a great deal less to buy some fertilizer, rent a truck, and use them to bring down a building. If a group has a generous sponsor, as Hamas does in Iran, they can afford to run charities and thereby secure popular support. Such a group can also afford to support the families of imprisoned or killed members. But it is not necessary at all to have this level of support in order to conduct terrorist operations. Terrorism is above all a tactic and its appeal as a tactic is precisely that one can get so much bang for one's buck. It is cheap and easy and lends itself to dramatic impact.

Sophisticated weaponry such as WMD is of course expensive. Aum Shinrikyo demonstrated this fact. I believe we have all learned from this experience and it is hard for me to imagine a situation anywhere in the world today in which a clandestine group could develop facilities of such sophistication, and recruits of such a technical caliber, without the state noticing. Another way for terrorists to secure these weapons is to be handed them by a state sponsor. My own view is that this fear is overblown. The act of ceding to a terrorist group one did not completely control weapons of mass destruction would be an act of such folly as to be incomprehensible. A state willing to risk annihilation might use the weapons itself but there are good reasons why none has done so. The reasons why they would not cede the means to a third party are even stronger.

My own prediction, therefore, is that we will see far more Bali type attacks than we will see September 11th type attacks. I worry sometimes that our concern to prevent the less likely and more expensive type of actions may deflect our attention from the need to prevent the more likely, less expensive, and more conventional attack.

I believe that the first priority in undermining terrorist organizations is to understand how they see themselves, not how we see them. To achieve this we must be inside their cells, and the societies that produce them. We must read all their communications and their propaganda in an effort to anticipate their actions but also to understand their appeal

I think we can learn from the terrorists as they have learned from us. We can learn to have patience and to wait for results. The brilliance of the 9/11 attack was its use of our own strength against us. They turned our civilian airlines into weapons against us. I think we must do the same. We must understand their ideology and their tactics and use them against them. Terrorist organizations operate under conditions of considerable uncertainty and are constantly fearful of both external attack and internal betrayal. We should exploit this by keeping them under constant pressure and exploiting their fissiparous tendencies. Their need to raise funds through criminal activity increases their exposure and gives us another avenue to pursue them.

If we undermine their support of charities this won't prevent terrorism per se. Many donors to the charities genuinely want to support the poor and many of these charities do a great deal of good for the beneficiaries. However, over the longer term, these charities serve to win and to sustain support for those providing the charity. I think, for example, that the support for Hamas has to be seen in this light. I believe that we should ensure that it is our friends who are meeting the social needs of the potential recruits of the terrorists. This is a long-term strategy but terrorism as a tactic has been around a very long time and it is likely to remain. What is new is the existence of

organizations willing to kill as many civilians as they can, and the increasing availability of the technical means to do so. Strangling their financial assets will make it increasingly difficult for terrorists to function, but it will not eliminate terrorism.

Thank you