

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, DC 20510

March 4, 2026

Mr. Lip-Bu Tan
CEO
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Santa Clara, CA 95054

We write to express concern about a recent report that Intel is testing chipmaking tools produced by ACM Research, a Chinese state-connected semiconductor company.¹ Given extensive national security restrictions on ACM subsidiaries, Intel's relationship with ACM is concerning.

The United States has imposed export controls on a range of advanced computing and semiconductor manufacturing technology to China to "protect U.S. national security interests by restricting the People's Republic of China[']s ... military modernization efforts and degrading its ability to violate human rights."² The Department of Commerce blacklisted two of ACM's subsidiaries, including ACM Research (Shanghai) and ACM Research Korea in December 2024 for their role in the "development or production of [integrated circuits] for military end use."³

In December, Reuters reported that Intel tested two ACM-produced "wet etch" tools for possible inclusion in Intel's most advanced chipmaking process.⁴ Wet etch tools are a critical piece of semiconductor manufacturing equipment, essential to creating precise circuit patterns. ACM works directly with companies like Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corporation, Yangtze Memory Technology Corporation, and ChangXin Memory Technologies.⁵ These companies have been identified by the U.S. government as linked to the People's Liberation

¹ Reuters, "Exclusive: Intel has tested chipmaking tools from firm with sanctioned China unit, sources say," Alexandra Alper and Max A. Cherney, December 12, 2025, <https://www.reuters.com/world/china/intel-has-tested-chipmaking-tools-firm-with-sanctioned-china-unit-sources-say-2025-12-12/>.

² U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security, Federal Register Notice, "Export Controls on Semiconductor Manufacturing Items," October 25, 2023, <https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2023/10/25/2023-23049/export-controls-on-semiconductor-manufacturing-items>.

³ U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security, "Commerce Strengthens Export Controls to Restrict China's Capability to Produce Advanced Semiconductors for Military Applications," press release, December 2, 2024, <https://www.bis.gov/press-release/commerce-strengthens-export-controls-restrict-chinas-capability-produce-advanced-semiconductors-military>; U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security, Federal Register Notice, "Additions and Modifications to the Entity List; Removals From the Validated End-User (VEU) Program," December 5, 2024, <https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2024/12/05/2024-28267/additions-and-modifications-to-the-entity-list-removals-from-the-validated-end-user-veu-program>.

⁴ Reuters, "Exclusive: Intel has tested chipmaking tools from firm with sanctioned China unit, sources say," Alexandra Alper and Max A. Cherney, December 12, 2025, <https://www.reuters.com/world/china/intel-has-tested-chipmaking-tools-firm-with-sanctioned-china-unit-sources-say-2025-12-12/>.

⁵ Reuters, "Exclusive: Intel has tested chipmaking tools from firm with sanctioned China unit, sources say," Alexandra Alper and Max A. Cherney, December 12, 2025, <https://www.reuters.com/world/china/intel-has-tested-chipmaking-tools-firm-with-sanctioned-china-unit-sources-say-2025-12-12/>; Semianalysis, "ACM Research, China's Most Successful Semiconductor Capital Equipment Provider, Wins At SK Hynix and Intel," Dylan Patel, July 18, 2022, <https://newsletter.semianalysis.com/p/acm-research-chinas-most-successful>.

Army (PLA) and China's defense industrial base.⁶ By operating in Intel's facilities, ACM could gain exposure to cutting-edge chipmaking processes that may materially improve the quality and competitiveness of ACM and these Chinese military companies. Intel's actions risk providing an avenue to overcome U.S. national security restrictions on these companies, granting them access to proprietary process insights that could be repurposed to advance China's domestic semiconductor industry.

Intel and ACM's reported relationship is also concerning given enormous taxpayer investment in Intel. Through the CHIPS and Science Act, Intel was awarded \$10.86 billion, the largest grant to a single company. The U.S. government later repurposed \$8.9 billion of this award into an equity investment, establishing the federal government and U.S. taxpayers as shareholders of the company.⁷ As it stands, the U.S. taxpayer currently owns approximately 10 percent of Intel and is the company's biggest stakeholder.⁸ This raises important questions about Intel's fiduciary responsibility and approach to safeguarding the public interest, including how the company benefits American economic interests and taxpayers. Intel's entanglements with blacklisted Chinese companies calls into question whether taxpayer dollars are subsidizing activities that could directly threaten U.S. national security and leadership in semiconductor manufacturing. We urge you to be a responsible steward of taxpayer funds and avoid further collaboration with ACM or any companies attempting to undermine U.S. export controls.

To better understand Intel's management of this relationship we request that you provide detailed responses to the following questions by March 20, 2026:

1. Confirm whether Intel has or has not tested the tools referenced in the Reuters report. If so, explain when this testing occurred and provide a detailed description of the scope and purpose of this testing.
2. What due diligence did Intel conduct on ACM Research before testing its equipment, particularly regarding ACM's ties to China and the Entity List status of its affiliates?
3. Did Intel seek or receive any authorization, guidance, or advisory opinion from BIS before testing tools produced by ACM or its affiliates? If so, provide a copy of all information.

⁶ U.S. Department of Defense, "Entities Identified as Chinese Military Companies Operating in the United States in Accordance with Section 1260H of the William M. ("Mac") Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 (Public Law 116-283)," January 7, 2025, <https://media.defense.gov/2025/Jan/07/2003625471/-1/-1/1/ENTITIES-IDENTIFIED-AS-CHINESE-MILITARY-COMPANIES-OPERATING-IN-THE-UNITED-STATES.PDF>.

⁷ CNBC, "U.S. government takes 10% stake in Intel, as Trump expands control over private sector," Kif Leswig, August 22, 2025, <https://www.cnbc.com/2025/08/22/intel-government-equity-stake.html>.

⁸ Intel, "Intel and Trump Administration Reach Historic Agreement to Accelerate American Technology and Manufacturing Leadership," press release, August 22, 2025, <https://www.intc.com/news-events/press-releases/detail/1748/intel-and-trump-administration-reach-historic-agreement-to>; NPR Planet Money, "The U.S. now owns a big chunk of Intel. That's a huge deal.," Jeff Guo, Keith Romer, Jess Jiang, and Sam Yellowhorse Kesler, September 12, 2025, <https://www.npr.org/2025/09/12/nx-s1-5540076/intel-trump-industrial-policy-socialism>.

4. What safeguards, if any, are currently in place to prevent ACM or its personnel from acquiring sensitive process knowledge through testing or integration at Intel's labs?
5. What policies and procedures does Intel have in place to screen equipment suppliers for national security concerns before testing or procuring their tools?
6. Given the federal government's financial stake in Intel, what mechanisms has Intel established, if any, to ensure that taxpayer-supported investments do not inadvertently benefit foreign adversaries or undermine U.S. export control objectives?
7. Will Intel commit to refraining from testing or using equipment from manufacturers with entity-listed affiliates without authorization from BIS?

Sincerely,




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Tom Cotton
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Pete Ricketts
United States Senator



Andy Kim
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Elissa Slotkin
United States Senator



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